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REVOLUTION, DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
CONSTITUTION-MAKING: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
VED P. NANDAt
I.
Scholars continue to debate the definition of political and social
revolution and offer various theories of revolution.' In 1971, French so-
cial and political philosopher Jacques Ellul lamented in his book Autopsy
of Revolution that "[n]owadays the term 'revolution' is flagrantly mis-
used to designate anything and everything."2 Indeed, the term "revolu-
tion" is used so broadly, to cover so many different situations, that schol-
ars fail to agree on its operational definition. To illustrate, although
coups d'itat are excluded, "revolution" is used to signify every one of
the following historical situations leading to political changes: the Eng-
lish Glorious Revolution of 1688; the American, French, Russian, and
Chinese Revolutions; the Cuban, Iranian, and other third-world revolu-
tions; the "velvet" revolutions connoting non-violent regime changes
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, including the defeat of
Communism in 1989 in Czechoslovakia and the changes in 2003 in
Georgia, 2004 in Ukraine, and 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, called "color revolu-
tions"-the Rose, Orange, and Tulip, respectively.
Among many scholars who have studied conventional revolutionary
theory, Theda Skocpol and Forrest Colburn, identify the major elements
associated with revolution. According to Skocpol, "[s]ocial revolutions
are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures;
and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based
t John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of
Law and Director, International and Comparative Legal Studies Program, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law
1. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (rev. ed. 1990); Rod Aya, Theories of
Revolution Considered, Contrasting Models of Collective Violence, 8 THEORY & SOCIETY 46 (1979);
CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1938); PETER CALVERT, A STUDY OF
REVOLUTION (1970); FORREST COLBURN, THE VOGUE OF REVOLUTION IN POOR COUNTRIES (1994);
Robert H. Dix, Varieties of Revolution, 15 COMP. POLITICS 281 (1983); JACQUES ELLUL, AUTOPSY
OF REVOLUTION (Patricia Wolf trans., 1971); Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., Revolution Reconsidered, 18
J. DEMOCRACY 42 (Jan. 2007); JACK A. GOLDSTONE, REVOLUTIONS (1986); SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); JAROSLAV KREJCI, GREAT
REVOLUTIONS COMPARED: THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY (1983); THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND
SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA 4 (1979);
CHARLES TILLEY, EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1492-1992 (1993); A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN IRAN (John Foran ed., 1994); THE COLOR REVOLUTIONS IN THE FORMER
SOVIET REPUBLICS: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES (Donnacha 0 BeachAin & Abel Polese eds., 2010).
2. Ellul, supra note 1, at 177.
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revolts from below." 3 Colburn writes that "revolution is the sudden, vio-
lent, and drastic substitution of one group governing a territorial entity
for another group, formerly excluded from the government, and an ensu-
ing assault on state and society for the purpose of radically transforming
society."A
The elements they identify are: (1) a government is overthrown by a
group "formerly excluded from the government"; (2) the change is usual-
ly rapid; (3) the change usually entails violence or threat of violence; and
(4) transformation occurs for society and state structures "from below,"
which is usually associated with popular participation from "the people."
Implicit in this description is the idea that the change occurred by uncon-
stitutional, illegal means.
Two of these elements of revolution-overthrow of a government
and transformation of society-are unchallenged. However, several criti-
cal questions on which there is no consensus among scholars and which
remain unanswered by Skocpol and Colburn, include how suddenly and
rapidly the change has to occur and how much violence or threat of vio-
lence has to accompany it. Also, the nature of transformation and the
issue of legitimacy of the new structure of the state and society are not
addressed in these definitions. Consider, for example, the American
Revolution as contrasted with the Russian Revolution that led to a totali-
tarian regime, or with the Iranian Revolution that led to an anti-
democratic, authoritarian theocracy, which has brutally suppressed free-
dom and people's choices.
The Denver University Law Review makes a valuable contribution
to the literature with this symposium, in which several noted scholars
thoughtfully respond to some of these questions by paying special atten-
tion to the outcome phase of revolutions.
II.
Three contributions specifically address the process by which a rev-
olution takes place. In their provocative piece, Democracy and Revolu-
tion: An Enduring Relationship?, Joel Colon-Rios and Allan C.
Hutchinson argue that for a revolution to be democratic, how an estab-
lished constitutional order is changed, that is, by unconstitutional or con-
stitutional means, does not matter. For them,
there is no sharp or enduring distinction between some revolutions
and constitutional changes: a robust democracy will incorporate con-
stitutional means by which to facilitate periodic revolutions. To para-
phrase de Tocqueville, there is no need in a true democracy to invent
3. Skocpol, supra note 1, at 4.
4. Colburn, supra note 1, at 6.
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the end of revolution as it becomes a continuing and integral part of
democratic arrangements themselves.5
Tuan Samahon, in Democracy, Violence, and Constitutional Revi-
sion in the Shadow of Democratic Revolution Theory,6 challenges the
assertion that so-called nonviolent revolutions in history were indeed
nonviolent-that the label "bloodless," used to describe the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 is misleading, as it involved a Dutch invasion by an
army of 14,000 and resulted in casualties in several battles that followed
the invasion. He also considers it a mistake to focus solely on Gandhi's
nonviolent campaign for India's independence, for the struggle involved
violence and bloodshed. Another example he gives is that of Kyrgyz-
stan's "Tulip Revolution," which, he says, was marred by violence and
political assassinations.
Haidar Ala Hamoudi challenges the usefulness of distinctions be-
tween "coup," "reform," and "revolution," in describing "normative
power of democratic transformations." Similarly he considers "less than
helpful . . . a relentless focus on the people as being the exclusive agent
of such transformation," as he suggests that "any transformation is fun-
damentally important, whether it be registered at the moment of change
or years later, at first election."8
All the contributors discuss various aspects of the outcome phase of
revolutions rather than their causes and procedural dimensions. Colon-
Rios and Hutchinson suggest that the theory of constituent power pro-
vides a much better explanation of democratic revolutions than other
competing theories. By "constituent power" they mean "the power to
create new constitutions or the source of the production of fundamental
juridical norms."9 Thus, according to them, this theory "is particularly
concerned with the identity of the creator of the constitution and with the
constitution-making process,"'0 and they find democracy's "disruptive
and unmanageable dimensions" worth celebrating.
However, because of the disruptive aspects of democracy in both
theory and practice, many scholars of constitutionalism reject constituent
power, and as an example, Colon-Rios and Hutchinson note Bruce
Akerman's description of constituent power as a lawless activity, identi-
fying it as an arbitrary will that it manifests itself as when "law ends, and
5. Joel Colon-Rios & Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Rela-
tionship?, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 593, 593 (2012) (citation omitted).
6. Tuan Samahon, Democracy, Violence, and Constitutional Revision in the Shadow of
Democratic Revolution Theory, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 735 (2012).
7. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Arab Spring, Libyan Liberation and the Externally Imposed Demo-
cratic Revolution, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 699 (2012).
8. Id. at 723.
9. Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 595.
10. Id
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pure politics (or war) begins."" They also cite Hannah Arendt as sharing
similar concerns and suggest that that is why in France, too, there was a
conscious attempt to prevent "constituent power's future exercise and
relevancy."l 2
Referring to the Arab despotic regimes having been overthrown be-
cause of their denial to citizens the liberal protections embodied in the
American and French Revolutions, they contend that
at a different and deeper level, all these societies (i.e., United States,
France, Libya, Egypt, etc.) share a fundamental similarity in constitu-
tional terms. Like the constitutions established by the American and
French revolutionaries, the juridical systems being challenged and
overthrown in the Middle East and Africa lack an opening for con-
stituent power to manifest from time to time. By prioritizing constitu-
tional supremacy over popular sovereignty and subordinating the lat-
ter to the former, these institutional arrangements attempt to avoid fu-
ture revolutions and democratic re-constitutions. Strong constitution-
alism trumps weak democracy.' 3
Next, they posit that democratic legitimacy of a revolution depends
not only on citizen support and governanc.e by the new regime in the
name of the citizenry, but also on "whether it attempts to re-produce its
democratic impulse through a weak constitutional order that provides
participatory procedures for its own transformation." 4 They refer to the
amendment rule of the U.S. Constitution, Article V, which provides a
very strict procedure for proposing amendments and even stricter process
for their ratification, making constitutional amendments very difficult to
adopt and the adoption procedure non-participatory because only repre-
sentatives are involved in the process. Thus, they contend that under this
process changes in constitutional arrangements do not happen, and what-
ever change does happen, it occurs by even less democratic means than
those provided for by the Constitution itself. Colon-Rios and Hutchinson
note that in the United States, for example, judges create changes under
the guise of interpretation, as in Brown v. Board of Educations and Roe
v. Wade.16
The authors challenge the suitability of courts to speak and act on
the people's behalf, for courts are neither constituted nor operated in a
representative fashion or according to popular will. Thus, they seem to
suggest that courts lack democratic legitimacy, and under the U.S. sys-
tem, democracy seems to be firmly put under the control of the Constitu-
11. BRUCE AKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998), quoted in Colon-
Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 597.
12. Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 598.
13. Id. at 600.
14. Id. at 594.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tion and is at best "reduced to merely one value in a much broader range
of constitutional commitments."1 7
Finally, Colon-Rios and Hutchinson propose what they themselves
call a radical proposal: that "an unconditional commitment to democracy
would require that revolutionary-initiated constitutions leave the door
open for future exercises of constituent power or, what is the same thing,
for future democratic revolutions."' 8 In conclusion, they provide a broad
vision of a truly democratic constitutional order under which constituent
power would be able to manifest and assert itself from time to time with-
out state interference, in the form, for example, of civil disobedience,
informal gatherings, and other types of protest, and which "would also
establish more formal and less complex processes which citizens could
trigger and through which they could deliberate and decide on important
constitutional transformations. . . . The constitutional journey of democ-
racy never ends, but occasionally pauses for breath."l 9
In The Importance of Constitution-Making, David Landau makes a
powerful and convincing case for paying special attention to the question
of what the new regime looks like after the revolution, which means "the
constitution-making moment [is] the key to understanding the effects of
revolution,"20 an area neglected thus far by traditional legal and constitu-
tional theory, as well as international law. He studies contemporary situa-
tions from North Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. He espe-
cially draws on Honduras, where he worked as part of a team for the
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation analyzing constitutional issues
surrounding the 2009 military coup in that country, which was provoked
by then President Zaliya's attempt to call a constituent assembly and
which resulted in his removal. Their task also included making recom-
mendations for constitutional reforms to strengthen Honduran democracy
and prevent a recurrence.
Landau examines the situation following the tumultuous events in
Egypt resulting in the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, a fluid
situation in which several social groups and political parties were com-
peting for control of the process of writing the new Egyptian constitu-
tion. He finds several other recent situations involving a regime change,
such as Venezuela after Chavez came to power and Libya where similar
tensions existed.
Landau takes several recent Latin American examples from Colom-
bia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, where constituent assemblies were
used to replace their constitutional texts while the old constitutions of
17. Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 605.
18. Id. at 594.
19. Id. at 609-10.




these countries did not provide for the use of a constituent assembly for
that purpose. In some cases, the courts did not pass on the legality of
these actions or the assembly proceeded even in the face of a negative
judicial ruling; while in other cases, the courts upheld the assembly on
the grounds that the people have a residual power to make or un-make
their constitutional order. The point Landau makes is that domestic con-
stitutional theory does not provide clear rules or constraints regarding the
constitution-making process. He also finds that international law, which
is subject to slow and subtle changes, fails as well to address this issue.
Using Egypt, Libya, and Honduras as examples, he concludes that "the
international community often responds far more forcefully and readily
to regime changes than it does to the complex but more important series
of events occurring after the regime change."21
Landau points to Honduras as an example of how both domestic and
international law suffer from serious gaps, for as the United States, the
Organization of American States, and other international actors provided
a rigorous response to the military coup and illegal overthrow of Presi-
dent Zaliya, they failed to even react to the various illegal actions he had
taken before the overthrow. Similarly, there has been no international
attention to the new government's efforts to re-write the entire Honduran
constitution.
Thus he argues that, while military coups are disfavored,
subtler attacks on the democratic institutions that provide "horizontal
accountability" to presidents, like congresses and courts, may be
more acceptable. At the very least, the president can use the mantle
of "popular legitimacy," arguing that he is carrying out the people's
will while other institutions are frustrating it. Zaliya repeatedly relied
on that sort of rhetoric. Chavez in Venezuela and Fujimori in Peru
provide clear examples of this threat-each undertook serious ma-
nipulations of legislatures and courts to attain maximal power. Correa
in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Uribe in Colombia have all pro-
vided more but still troubling cases of the same trend. Internal ero-
sion of democracy, rather than the military coup, is now the major
threat to democracy in Latin America and perhaps in most of the
world.22
Reiterating that questions of constitution-making process are criti-
cal, Landau warns that political actors and social groups may use the
process by invoking "claims to majoritarian support (whether true or
false), and tools such as plebiscites and referenda" to impose their own
21. Id at 621.
22. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
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desired constitution so as to remake the state to serve their own inter-
ests.23
In conclusion Landau calls for new scholarship, especially on con-
stitution-making. He suggests that there is an urgent need to develop
guidelines and principles that the international community can use to
evaluate the proposed constitutional assemblies in the new or reconstitut-
ed democracies. 24
In a well-documented article, Constitutional Pragmatism, the Su-
preme Court, and Democratic Revolution,25 Mark S. Kende studies the
U.S. constitutional revolution, presenting his thesis that different types of
pragmatism have shaped the revolution. His typology includes com-
monsense, transitional, political, democratic, economic, empirical, com-
mon law, flexible, critical, and comprehensive pragmatism. While most
of these are essential components of revolution, a few, such as critical
and comprehensive pragmatism, are not. Also, he does not explore philo-
sophical pragmatism in depth. In the discussion of each type of pragma-
tism he examines its connection to the U.S. constitutional revolution and
cites pertinent U.S. Supreme Court cases to support his thesis.
This article, which Kende calls "mainly descriptive and somewhat
exploratory,"26 is part of his larger project on pragmatism in constitution-
al thought, which he hopes "can help scholars, judges, and others discuss
constitutional pragmatism more intelligently, as well as see its complexi-
ty and ubiquity." He says, for example, that political scientists could use
his typology to code Supreme Court cases.
Kende contends in conclusion that his article "does not argue that
the [Supreme] Court should reject the more traditional modalities in con-
stitutional interpretation, such as precedent and text. It also does not ex-
clude the relevance of moral considerations. Yet the paper is sympathetic
to the claim that pragmatic considerations are and should frequently be
dispositive."27
Stephen M. Feldman sketches the supplanting of the republican
democratic regime under which the United States had operated from the
framing through the 1920s by the new pluralist democratic regime in the
early 1930s. In his article, Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin in America,28 he says that what brought about the change was a
combination of forces, including industrialization, urbanization, and im-
23. Id. at 629. See generally id. at 629-32.
24. Id. at 633.
25. Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Pragmatism, the Supreme Court, and Democratic Revolu-
tion, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 635 (2012).
26. Id. at 637.
27. Id. at 670.
28. Stephen M. Feldman, Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin in America,
89 DENV. U. L. REV. 671 (2012).
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migration. Republican democracy in the United States meant that "citi-
zens and elected officials were supposed to be virtuous; in the political
realm, they were to pursue the common good or public welfare rather
than their own 'partial or private interests."' 29
Feldman states that historicism, ethical relativism, and social sci-
ence empiricism, which are modem intellectual components, "were man-
ifested in political realities" in the new era.3 0 He describes the change:
According to pluralist democratic theorists, the only way to deter-
mine public values and goals was through a process of "free competi-
tion [among] interest groups." By "composing or compromising"
their different values and interests, the "competing groups [would]
coordinate their aims in programs they can all support." Legislative
decisions therefore turned on negotiation, persuasion, and the exer-
tion of pressure through the normal procedures of democratic gov-
ernment. Process rather than substance (such as the substance of the
common good) determined the legitimacy of governmental actions.31
Since the transition from republican to pluralist democracy was nei-
ther sudden nor violent, but was certainly historic, and depending upon
how one defines revolution, it could indeed be considered revolutionary.
Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and Eric Voegelin all opposed plural-
ist democracy. They had all escaped from Nazi Germany in the 1930s
and by the beginning of the 1950s were influential political philosophers
in the United States. Strauss rejected historicism on the ground that it
"undermines the very possibility of knowledge and understanding." 32 He
criticized social scientists for claiming that modem social science is
"value-free" and "ethically neutral," and warned that "[m]odern social
science, with its desire to be empirical and 'neutral in the conflict be-
tween good and evil,' relegates us to a radical and irrational individual-
ism-where each person acts on arbitrary preferences-and ultimately,
to nihilism."3 3 Later, he turned to classical political philosophy, arguing
that "it could lead us from opinion to truth."3 4 Harkening back to the era
of republican democratic regime, Strauss called for "the political activi-
ties of citizens and governmental officials [to] be virtuous, aiming for
perfection and justice."3 s
For Hannah Arendt, "modernity generated danger: it not only ren-
dered possible totalitarianism, Nazism, and the Holocaust, but also
threatened the United States and its pluralist democratic system with
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 673.
31. Id. at 674 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 676.
33. Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 683 (citation omitted).
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risks unrecognized by most Americans."36 According to her, politics or
political action could cure the ills of modernity, for "politics could be the
source and the realm of meaningful human existence."37 She rejected
pluralist democracy, considering it to be "a process-structured pursuit of
self-interest." 38
Eric Voegelin was, just as Strauss and Arendt, critical of modernity
because, according to him, "its roots are twisted around a cancerous mis-
interpretation of society, vis-a-vis 'the transcendent order of being."' 39
He considered modern societies to be spiritually and religiously bank-
rupt, and the answer was "a resurrected devotion to Christianity, which
he deemed the best interpretation of God and experience." 4 0 Feldman
says that Voegelin's emphasis on religion, especially on Christianity,
"appealed to a coterie of 'Catholic, traditional conservatives,' but it could
not captivate a more diverse group of American intellectuals."4 1
Arendt's writings have, however, been heralded within the world of
political theory. Among the three dissenters, Strauss has been especially
influential on the American political scene, for, as Feldman says,
"[n]umerous neoconservatives have drawn sustenance from Strauss's
thought."42 He specifically mentions Irving Kristol and Allan Bloom,
who "echoed Straussian themes with their attacks on the ethical relativ-
ism of modernity and the substantive vacuity of pluralist democracy.
They called for a renewed 'moral clarity' that harkened back to the re-
publican democratic concepts of virtue and the common good." 4 3
Feldman suggests that
because the neocons exerted political power during Republican pres-
idencies, several neoconservative oriented Justices have been ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court and have subsequently brought neo-
conservative themes to bear in their decisions and opinions, especial-
ly those related to constitutional jurisprudence. The now standard
conservative invocation of originalism denotes a desire to return to a
pre-1937 republican democratic style ofjudicial review.4
He names Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia as flag bearers
for this approach on the Court, and pays homage to these dissenters:
"[W]hile pluralist democracy remains predominant, the dmigrds dissent-
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 688.
39. Id at 690 (citation omitted)
40. Id at 692 (citation omitted).
41. Id at 693 (citation omitted).
42. Id at 695.
43. Id at 696-97 (citation omitted).
44. Id at 697 (citations omitted).
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ing voices have made (and continue to make) their marks in American
political thought and government.A
Hamoudi distinguishes between democratic transformations of the
state and non-democratic political transformations, placing the uprisings
in the Arab world in the former category and the Iranian Revolution of
1979, which he discusses in detail, in the latter category. His main point
is that it is not the agency of the democratic transformation with which
we should be concerned, but instead with the democratic transformation
itself. He discusses at length the transformation in Spain from Franco by
the King of Spain. He also gives examples of external interventions that
brought about democratic transformations in Iraq and Japan: Iraq
achieved popular democratic rule by U.S. intervention, and in post-
World War II Japan, General MacArthur imposed his vision of a new
constitution for Japan, which "remains in force and is the foundational
document of its liberal democracy."4 6
Hamoudi applauds the NATO intervention in Libya, for NATO's
support was critical for the rebels' success. He advocates external inter-
vention to bring about democracy in a country where there is popular
support for it and considers references to "responsibility to protect" and
humanitarian intervention "quite deleterious" because they require
nations to obfuscate respecting the nature of their intervention, which
of course can lead to confusion respecting its ultimate aims. Qaddafi
insists preposterously that NATO's ambitions were colonial. It is
helpful when confronting such nonsense to respond with what one's
true aims are as they concern regime change (namely, democratic
transformation), and why they are legitimate, rather than to obfuscate
in turn by claiming the aim of protecting civilians even when the ac-
tions are clearly not directed in such a fashion.47
The second reason he offers is that "the honest approach permits the re-
capture of the sacred ground for democratic transformation. It permits
the United States to establish and proclaim clearly its values, and explain
when it might be derogating from them and why."4 8
Hamoudi acknowledges "that the United States and its NATO allies
may not be in any sort of position to intervene to impose democracy
wherever the ground seems suitably fertile."49 But, he suggests that we
should admit to ourselves that "this is a compromise to principle rather
than its realization and that our commitments, our sympathies, our ideals,
45. Id.
46. Hamoudi, supra note 7, at 727 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 732-33 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 733.
49. Id.
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and our vision lie with the democratic revolutionaries and not with their
opponents."5 o
In conclusion he recommends that our commitment to the transfor-
mation should
be unaltered if achieved with the support, or even the instigation, of
an external power with subsequent popular endorsement or by a do-
mestic force, friendly monarch or professional military, acting with
popular support. In the end, what is at stake is government, of, for,
and by the people. How it is achieved, and by whom in the first in-
stance, is of little consequence.s5
This indeed is a radical thought, for notwithstanding the nobility of
a country's intensions-especially those of the United States-to pro-
mote democracy abroad, unilateral military intervention, or intervention
by a "coalition of the willing," is in the face of the U.N. Charter's prohi-
bition on the use of force as embodied in Article 2(4)52 and the interna-
tional community's 2005 Summit Outcome Document's commitment to
authorize the U.N. Security Council as the only body to intervene by the
use of force and this only when a state is manifestly unable or unwilling
to protect its citizens from atrocity crimes-genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Such interventions if undertak-
en unilaterally are likely to create anarchy which a country committed to
the rule of law, such as the United States, must unequivocally reject.
Finally, in his response to Richard Albert's paper on democratic
revolution, Samahon considers the role of constitutional revision and
interpretation as means of bringing about changes in society. He asks
whether the U.S. Constitution's Article V and its interpretation could
"adequately serve the ends that a democratic revolution might otherwise
seek to attain,"54 and concludes that if revolution's association with vio-
lence is true, "Article V rightfully becomes more attractive as a delibera-
tive mechanism for change that seeks broad consensus and change with-
out the inevitable bloodshed that attends the People's irregular exercise
of constituting power.""
50. Id
51. Id. at 733-34.
52. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any otheT manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
53. U.N. General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138, 139,
U.N. Doe. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdfPOpenElement. See generally Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in
Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: Emergence of the "Responsibility to Protect" Norm Under Inter-
national Law-Is the International Community Ready for It?, 34 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011).
54. Samahon, supra note 6, at 743.
55. Id. at 745.
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III.
This symposium clarifies many aspects related to the study of revo-
lution. The authors provide fresh insights into the post-revolution phase
in a country passing through democratic transformation. Scholars and
statesmen, alike, will greatly benefit from the valuable suggestions pro-
vided in these essays on constitution-making.
